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Abstract
Behavioural experiments in the field of provision of public goods (including free rider problem) help 
to uncover the underlying processes and forces determining the nature of economy in the public 
sector. The objective of this paper is to determine the impact of gender and intergroup conditions 
on the extent of cooperation in standard linear public goods game using the voluntary contribution 
mechanism. Design of the teaching experiment is based on the methodology of Špalek (2011) with 
some modification. There were 80 undergraduate students of business participating in the classroom 
game, age range 20 – 22 years. Students were divided into three independent groups by 26 to 27 
participants. Each group was playing independently, and individual strategies were recorded. We used 
the nonparametric tests (Mann‑Whitney U test and Kruskal‑Wallis Test) to analyse the differences 
between the gender and groups. Findings do not show statistically significant difference based 
on gender. On the other hand, the intergroup conditions determined by the social dynamics and 
discussion have significant influence on the distribution of goods. Results bring strong evidence on 
the importance of social and political factors influencing the pro‑social behaviour in the society.  
Keywords: public goods game, voluntary contribution mechanism, free‑rider problem, cooperation, 
gender
INTRODUCTION
Linear public goods games are often used for 
classroom experiments to present the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) and the free‑riding 
problem. In a public goods game participants 
choose how much of an initial endowment they 
want to contribute to a group account. The money 
on the group account from all players is multiplied 
by a certain multiplier and is divided among all, 
regardless if they contributed or not. The group 
account represents pure public goods with their 
definition features: non‑excludability in their 
benefits and non‑rivalry in consumption.
Players have their own strategies between two 
extremes: to contribute their entire endowment 
to the provision of public goods and to maximize 
the group welfare (the Pareto efficient result for all 
participants), or not to contribute and free‑ride 
because it could be seen as more optimal privately 
(the Nash equilibrium strategy). The free‑rider 
problem is based on the concept of hommo 
economicus – rational agents trying to maximize 
their own utility do not contribute to the public 
goods because they hope that others would. In 
Stiglitz (1988) individuals have no incentives to pay 
for public services voluntarily and that is why they 
must be forced to pay through taxation. 
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First experiments testing the free‑rider 
problem did not confirm that the free‑riding 
was a predominant behavioural strategy (Bohm 
1972; Dawes et al., 1977; Ames and Marwell; 1981). 
Later, experiments were more focused on finding 
the factors which enable to increase the average 
contribution rate (e.g. The marginal per capita 
return, gender, group size, communication, 
repetition, positive framing, experienced 
participants, subject’s beliefs regarding others’ 
participants’ behaviour). 
Our paper aims to determine the impact of 
the chosen factors on the extent of cooperation 
in standard linear public goods game using 
the voluntary contribution mechanism. We have 
conducted the classroom experiment what enables 
us to have participants with similar backgrounds for 
decision‑making. We focused on the factors: gender 
and intergroup differences in individual strategies 
during the whole session. The intergroup differences 
could relate to the communication possibilities and 
character features of group members. In this area 
existing empirical evidence still does not provide 
unambiguous results. 
The paper is structured as follows: first part 
of the paper summaries the results of current 
empirical studies concerning the analysed factors 
and their impact on the extent of cooperation. Then, 
the classroom game design, research questions 
and methods are presented. The conducted 
teaching experiment demonstrates different 
impact of the gender and intergroup differences on 
the pro‑social behaviour in the society. In the part 
discussion the results of our classroom game 
are evaluated and compared with other similar 
economic and teaching experiments. 
Literature Review
Empirical research focused on the gender impact 
on the contribution rate in linear public games and 
prisoner ’s dilemma experiment is not uniform. In 
contrary, it could not be determined whether men or 
women contributed more in general. 
Zelmer (2001) used meta‑analysis technique to 
assess the impact of various factors on the rate of 
contribution to public goods in linear public goods 
experiments (27 studies were included). Gender 
was identified as not significant, because there 
was little variability among the studies. However, 
communication between subjects improved 
cooperation. 
Tab. I summarizes results of empirical studies 
concerning the impact of gender on the extent of 
cooperation. 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) found that men 
chose cooperative strategies significantly more 
than women (in prisoners’ dilemma). Similarly, 
Leuthold’s teaching experiments (1992) confirmed 
that women free‑rode more than men, but 
the difference was not relevant. Brown‑Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) wanted to test their interpretation 
of the theory of Gilligan (1982) suggesting that 
women contribute more to the group welfare, but 
the results were reversed. Similarly, in Holt and 
Laury (1997) women contribute less to the public 
good than men. But authors are aware that gender 
effects might interact with the social context in 
which decisions are made. 
Cadsby and Mynes (1998) replicated 
the experimental results of Brown‑Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) with a different random recruitment 
mechanism and found no significant gender 
differences. Ortmann and Tichy (1995) studied 
a prisoner‘s dilemma game based on the similar 
principles than the linear public goods games 
and at the beginning of the game, women were 
significantly more cooperative. By the end, there 
was no significant difference between males and 
females. Špalek (2011) did not find significant 
gender differences during the whole experiment 
but outlined some differences when conditions 
changed (after group discussion and the change of 
cost of contribution). 
McCorkle and Watts (1996) used the same version 
as Leuthold (1992) for Ukrainian economics 
teachers without any modification of the main game 
principles. Their results were dissimilar – women 
contributed more than men. Nowell and Tinkler 
(1994) found some evidence that all‑female groups 
are more cooperative than either all‑male or mixed 
gender groups. 
Beliefs and the framing effect are also indicated 
as important factors causing gender differences 
in behaviour connected with cooperativeness. 
Aguiar et al. (2009) analysed beliefs about altruisms 
and generosity in a dictator game. While women 
believe that women are more generous, men 
consider that women are as generous as men. In 
I: Impact of gender on the extent of cooperation in empirical studies
Men contribute more No significant differences Women contribute more
Rapoport  and Chammah (1965) Ledyard (1995) Gilligan (1982)
Leuthold (1987, 1992) Cadsby and Maynes (1998) Nowell and Tinkler (1994)
Brown‑Kruse and Hummels (1993) Ortmann and Tichy (1999) McCorkle and Watts (1996)
Holt and Laury (1997) Zelmer (2003) Špalek (2011) conditionally
Špalek (2011) in general
Vyrastekova et al. (2015)
Source: Own elaboration
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contrary, Vyrastekova et al. (2015) did the experiment 
to identify gender beliefs in a public goods game 
and their impact on cooperation. Men expected 
the groups to be more cooperative when more 
women were in the group. No direct effect in 
the contribution rate in different groups was found 
when there was a control for beliefs. These results 
under control could explain dissimilar gender 
behavior in past experiments. In Bruttel and 
Stolley (2018) the effect of two different frames on 
decisions in a dictator game for males and females 
was tested (emphasizing either decision power or 
responsibility). Women were more generous when 
using a text that emphasizes their decision power 
and men reacted positively to a text that stresses 
their responsibility for the receiver.
Our classroom game tests also the impact of 
discussion / communication about the group 
strategy as a part of the intergroup conditions 
analysis. In most experiments the possibility to 
communicate increases the rate of contribution 
to the group account. In Zemler’s meta‑analysis 
(2001) the communication is the factor with 
a positive and significant effect on the average level 
of contribution to the public good. In Isaac and 
Walker (1988) communication has improved group 
optimality significantly – with no communication 
the tendency to zero contribution was shown. 
The paper findings differ from the results of 
the most empirical studies in this area. In our 
teaching experiment there was different impact of 
the group discussion on the rate of contribution to 
the common account depending on the discussion 
content and on the existence of the “successful or 
unsuccessful” leader in the group. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Design of the teaching experiment
The teaching experiment in the form of classroom 
game was conducted in winter 2017 during seminars 
in Public finance at the Mendel University in Brno. 
There were 80 undergraduate students of business 
participating in the classroom game, age range 
20 – 22 years. They had some background knowledge 
in economics (starting the 7th term). Students were 
randomly divided into three independent groups 
(26 and 27 participants), 75 % of them were women. 
Students had neutral instruction about the game 
(no information about the free riding problem 
or about the other possible strategies); length of 
the game was known. The session had 9 rounds and 
participants had 2 points to use for each round. They 
could keep them on their personal account or invest 
them to the common / group account (choosing 0, 1 
or 2 points on the website to invest).
The points on the group account from all players 
were multiplied by 10 CZK and this amount 
was earnings for all players, regardless if they 
contributed or not. The points on the personal 
account were multiplied by 40 CZK for rounds 1 – 3 
and 7 – 9 and by 20 CZK for rounds 4 – 6. After the 6th 
round the group discussion was possible to propose 
the strategy for last three rounds. The goal of 
the session for a student was to maximize the points 
on their individual account. During the session 
there was no intervention from the side of a teacher. 
Participants recorded their individual strategy on 
paper sheets (including points on the individual 
account, sum on the common account and 
the whole remuneration). Anonymity for recording 
was required and no communication was allowed 
except of the group   discussion after 6th round. 
There were some differences in the design of 
classroom game compared to Špalek (2011). First, 
the voting was via smartphones not via cards. 
Second, the use of Google forms for our teaching 
experiment enabled to show the results after each 
round including the amount of the points for 
the group of men and for the group of women. 
Therefore, the participants had information not 
only about the total amount on the group account 
but also about  the choice of the group of women and 
the group of men. This change could have impact on 
their strategies and beliefs. Third, the gender ratio 
was different in our groups than in Špalek (2011). 
In our groups the gender ratio was in average 75 % 
in favour of women, in the groups of Špalek (2011) 
there were only slightly more women than men 
(52 % of women). 
Methods
As a general objective we search for 
understanding of internal processes in the group 
decision‑making on the free‑riding phenomenon, 
that is the outcome of group dynamics and inner 
group processes. 
The objective of this paper is to determine 
the impact of gender and intergroup conditions on 
the extent of cooperation in standard linear public 
goods game using the voluntary contribution 
mechanism. In line with theoretical research and 
current findings in other empirical studies we 
formulate research questions as follows:
1. Is there a difference between males and females 
in total points on the personal account during 
the whole session (how many points did they 
keep)?
2. Is there a difference between various groups 
in total points on the personal account during 
the whole session (depending on the intergroup 
conditions)?
We analysed points on individual account for each 
person during all rounds focused on the gender and 
intergroup conditions. We used the nonparametric 
test (Mann‑Whitney U test and Kruskal‑Wallis Test) 
to analyse the differences between the gender and 
groups. Every person was assigned to the defined 
strategy types and the share of the different types 
inside the groups A, B, C and the groups of women 
and men was determined. 
We defined 5 types of individual strategies 
according the total points on the personal account 
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during the whole session. Maximum of points that 
could be kept on individual account is 18 (9 rounds 
per 2 points) – the person did not contribute 
to the group account and could be described 
as the “Pure Keeper”. This strategy is the pure 
free‑riding strategy that was in line with the “hommo 
economicus” concept. Another extreme is the “Pure 
Giver” – this strategy means that the person invested 
all points on the group account and there are no 
points on his / her personal account. To contribute 
all points to the group account is the strategy that 
maximizes the group welfare. The “Mixed strategy” 
is in the middle of the spectrum of all individual 
strategies and it represents the person who 
contributed 1 point in average for each round. 
The most used strategies are both “Partial” 
strategies – “Partial Keeper” with the tendency 
to be more individual and “Partial Giver” with 
the inclination to act in accordance with the group 
needs. Shares of those two types of strategies on all 
strategies for the group of women are compared 
with the group of men; the same comparison is done 
for groups A, B, C.
Then, comparison of the average rate of 
the contribution to the common account was 
carried out for the group of men and women; and 
for each group of participants. 
RESULTS
Following chapter depicts results in 
the subsections containing gender and intergroup 
differences. First part focuses on gender differences, 
second part deals with intergroup processes. 
We used the Mann‑Whitney U test to analyze 
the differences between genders analyzing the total 
score during the whole session represented by 
total points on the personal account. Fig. 1 depicts 
the boxplot for the males and females, where we can 
identify slight difference. 
However, Mann‑Whitney test (Tab. III) shows that 
there is no statistical difference between genders in 
the total score in the game (p < 0.05).
Additionally, we compared individual strategies 
in groups A, B, C between the group of women 
and the group of men during the whole session. 
The results are shown in the Fig. 2. The differences 
in partial strategies were not significant. The share 
of partial givers differed by 1.77 pp and the share of 
partial keepers in the group of men were only 5 pp 
higher than in the group of women.  Even, when 
there was the absence of pure givers in the group 
of men, the share of pure givers was only 5 % in 
the group of women. Therefore, no significant 
difference was found.
II: Individual strategy types used in analysis
Points on personal account
Pure Giver 0
Partial Giver Less than 9
Mixed Strategy 9





































1: Box plot, total points on individual accounts, gender differences
Source: authors
III: Mann‑Whitney test, differences between males and females, total points on individual accounts in the game, N = 80
U Z p‑value Z (adjusted)
Total score 583,00 0,18 0,85 0,18
Source: authors
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Finally, the comparison of the rate of 
the contribution to the common account was 
carried out for the group of men and women 
(Fig. 3). For rounds 1 – 3 the rate of the contribution 
to the common account is higher for the group of 
men; for rounds 4 – 9 the rate of the contribution 
to the common account is higher for the group of 
women, but the differences in both cases are not 
relevant. The average rate of the contribution to 
the common account for all rounds was 41.4 % for 
men, 41.6 % for women and 41.5 % for all participants. 
In the next part we analyze the differences 
between the groups which were playing the game 
separately (intergroup conditions). Fig. 4 depicts 
2: Gender differences in individual strategies types for all groups
Source: authors




































4: Box plot, total points on individual accounts, gender difference
Source: authors
IV: Kruskal‑Wallis Test, differences among the groups, total points on individual account, N = 80, * p < 0.1
A (R : 34,926) B (R : 36,385) C (R : 50,037)
A  1,000 0,051*
B 1,000  0,098*
C 0,051* 0,098*  
Source: authors
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boxplot of total scores in the game (points 
on individual account), analyzing the three 
separate scores of the groups. Group A and 
group B achieved relatively similar scores. On 
the other hand, group C achieved significantly 
higher score – there were more points kept on 
the personal / individual accounts.
Kruskal‑Wallis Test (tab. 4) shows that there is 
a significant difference in the total score between 
the group A and group B versus the group C.
These results were supported by the analysis 
of individual strategies during the whole game. 
We abstracted from the both “pure” strategies 
and focused on the shares of partial givers, partial 
keepers and mixed strategies. Mixed strategy was 
not represented in the group B.
The highest difference between the share of 
partial givers and the share of partial keepers was 
48.2 pp in the group C and the smallest difference 
was 14.9 pp in the group A. High share of partial 
keepers in the group C could be the result of 
significant decrease of the contribution rate to 
the common account after group discussion.
When we compare the rate of the contribution to 
the common account for each group of participants, 
dissimilar development for the group A and 
the group C compared to the group B could be 
identified in rounds after discussion (Fig. 5). In the 7th 
round, the rate of the contribution to the common 
account for the group B was distinctively higher 
than in the groups A and C and there was a decline of 
the rate of the contribution to the common account 
for the group A and C. The rate of the contribution 
to the common account for the group A was higher 
than in both other groups for rounds 1 – 6. 
The average rate of the contribution to the common 
account for all rounds was 47.5 % for the group A, 
42.9 % for the group B and 34.2 % for the group C. We 
can see that the average rate of the contribution to 
the common account is 7.3 pp lower for the group C 
than the average rate for all participants. Decline of 
the rate of contribution to the common account for 
the group A in last three rounds was compensated by 
higher rate of contribution for rounds 1‑6 compared 
to group B and C. 
DISCUSSION
The results of the paper could be compared with 
Špalek (2011). We have partly modified his design of 
the classroom game therefore, some differences in 
our results could be expected. First, in our groups 
of participants the gender ratio was in average 
75 % in favour of women, in the groups of Špalek 
(2011) there were only slightly more women than 
men (52 % of women). Second, after each round we 
showed not only the results for the whole group but 
also the amount of the points for the group of men 
and for the group of   women. Figures 6 and 7 depict 
the rates of the contribution to the common account 
(rate of cooperation) in our classroom game and in 
the teaching experiment of Špalek (2011) during 
the whole session. 
Fig. 6 represents the rates of cooperation related 
to gender diversity and fig. 7 displays average rate 
of the contribution for all groups and genders. 
The main differences were demonstrated after 
6th round when discussion was possible in both 
teaching experiments. Špalek (2011) found that after 
discussion the contribution rate to the common 
account increased. This statement was in line with 
our results, but for the the 7th round the growth 
was lower for all groups (women and men) than in 
Špalek (2011). 
The average rate of contribution to the common 
account compared to Špalek (2011) was higher in our 
V: Shares of individual strategies types in groups A, B, C in %
Group A Group B Group C
Partial Giver 33.3 34.6 18.5
Mixed strategy 11.1 0.0 7.4
Partial Keeper 48.2 61.5 66.7
Source: authors
5: Rate of the contribution to the common account for all groups (9 rounds of the game)
Source: authors
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classroom game for rounds 1 – 6 (before discussion); 
however, they did not differ significantly. But 
there was opposite difference for rounds 7 – 9 
when the cooperation was higher in the teaching 
experiment of Špalek (2011). The evaluation failed 
to show that in the groups with more women 
(average share was 75 %) the rate of contribution to 
the common account was not higher for all rounds 
than in Špalek (2011) with 52 % of women. It is not 
possible to conclude that the groups with more 
women contributed more to the common account. 
In contrary, when we compare the average rate 
of contribution to the common account in both 
teaching experiments, the rate of Špalek (2011) is 
by 2.6 pp higher than in our experiment (41.5 %). 
Details of this comparison for each round could 
be seen in Fig. 7. Lower contribution rate in our 
classroom game after communication could be 
explained by intergroup differences which will be 
discussed in the next part.
In the group C there was considerable drop in 
cooperation after discussion what had impact 
on the total points on the individual account 
and therefore the significant difference between 
groups occurred. We could observe during 
the discussion that one student tried to persuade 
other participants to invest all to the group 
account as the only right strategy but with 
his interpretation he frustrated the others. In 
the group A decline of the rate of contribution to 
the common account could be explained by an 
impressive speech of one student – he explained 
his strategy to keep all points on personal 
account as the best solution for each individual 
participant. 
The result was decline in contribution rate to 
the common account for last three rounds. We could 
see that communication and the person of leader 
(successful or unsuccessful) had notable impact on 
the extent of cooperation.
6: Rate of the contribution to the common account for men and women (9 rounds of the game)
Source: Authors, Špalek (2011) 
7: Average rate of the contribution to the common account (9 rounds of the game)
Source: authors, Špalek (2011)
CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper was to determine the impact of gender and intergroup conditions on 
the extent of cooperation in standard linear public goods game using the voluntary contribution 
mechanism. 
Mann‑Whitney test and performed analysis of individual strategy types showed that there was no 
significant statistical difference between genders in total points on the personal account during 
the whole session. The absence of pure altruists / givers in the group of men was not sufficient to 
show predominance of women in cooperation behaviour. The average rate of the contribution to 
the common account for all rounds was only 0.1 pp lower for men and 0.1 pp higher for women than 
the average rate for all participants. 
Analysis of intergroup conditions showed different results for the group C compared to other groups ‑ 
the group C achieved significantly higher score (points kept on the personal account). This difference 
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was verified by Kruskal‑Wallis and the analysis of individual strategy types. The reason for more points 
kept on the personal / individual accounts in group C could be the development of contribution rate 
to the common account after the group discussion as it had been already mentioned before. 
The average rate of the contribution to the common account for all rounds was 7.3 pp lower for 
the group C than average and 6 pp higher for the group A. The rate of cooperation for the group B was 
slightly above average (1.4 pp).
We plan modify our future research in following directions. First, it could be reasonable to conduct 
the same analysis for six rounds first (without discussion) and then for last three rounds separately 
and compare the results with Špalek (2011) to avoid distortion because of the communication 
and to focus on gender differences. Second, more detailed analysis of each member of the group 
could be added to determine the differences in the group via psychological tests (focused on 
cooperativeness, competitiveness and leadership). Finally, we plan to obtain more data from further 
teaching experiments with modified experimental design (e.g. testing of gender beliefs and framing 
effects). 
In most empirical studies regarding the linear public goods game there is positive effect of 
the communication on the rate of contribution to the public goods. But our findings show that 
if there was an unsuccessful leader or the successful leader promoting the free‑riding strategy 
the impact could be opposite. Results bring strong evidence on the importance of social and 
political factors influencing the pro‑social behaviour in the society.  
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